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I. Introduction
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standard of care for treating a life-threatening parasitic
infection.
The drug, called Daraprim, was acquired in August 2015 by
Turing Pharmaceuticals, a start-up run by a former hedge
fund manager [named Martin Shkreli]. Turing immediately
raised the price to $750 a tablet from $13.50, bringing the
annual cost of treatment for some patients to hundreds of
thousands of dollars.1

The public was outraged.2 Congressional hearings were held.3
Shkreli was arrested for fraud in an unrelated matter, and he
was forced to resign from Turing.4 He promised to lower the price
of Daraprim, a promise that he largely did not keep.5 More
1. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes From $13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/ahuge-overnight-increase-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html (last visited Mar.
30, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Emma
Court, Here’s Why Daraprim Still Costs $750 a Pill, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 4,
2016),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-why-daraprimstill-costs-750-a-pill-2016-02-03 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (discussing the
Daraprim price increase) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Heather Long, Here’s What Happened to AIDS Drug That Spiked 5,000%, CNN
MONEY
(Aug.
25,
2016,
12:10
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/25/news/economy/daraprim-aids-drug-high-price/
(last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Victor Luckerson, Everything to Know About the Arrested Drug PriceHiking CEO, TIME (Dec. 17, 2015), http://time.com/4153512/martin-shkrelipharmaceuticals-arrested-turing-daraprim/ (last updated Dec. 18, 2015, 12:48
PM) (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (same) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Lydia Ramsey, There’s Now A $1-A-Pill Competitor To Pharma
CEO Martin Shkreli’s $750-A-Pill Drug, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 22, 2015, 4:27
PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/a-compound-pharma-company-is-makinga-daraprim-killer-2015-10 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (same) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See Long, supra note 1 (discussing public response to the Daraprim
price increase).
3. See Court, supra note 1 (noting hearings held before the House
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform).
4. See Luckerson, supra note 1 (“[T]he 32-year-old entrepreneur [Shkreli]
has been arrested for securities fraud in a case tied to a separate pharma
company that he used to run . . . . Shkreli has resigned as CEO of Turing
Pharmaceuticals.”).
5. See Court, supra note 1 (discussing Turing’s promise to lower
Daraprim’s price).
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recently, while there has been some decline, at last report
Daraprim apparently still costs significantly more than it did
before the initial price increase.6 Meanwhile, other companies
have promised to bring the drug to market far more cheaply.7
Wells Fargo has also recently elicited significant outrage.8
Bank employees were caught having opened millions of “ghost”
bank and credit card accounts for existing customers, responding
to pressure to sell each customer or household eight banking

6. See Long, supra note 1 (noting that (as of the date of the article)
Daraprim’s price was still approximately $375 per pill).
7. See Ramsey, supra note 1 (discussing compounding pharmacies that
are offering dramatically cheaper alternatives).
8. See Geoff Colvin, Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf’s $41 Million
‘Clawback’
Isn’t
What
It
Appears,
FORTUNE
(Oct.
3,
2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/10/03/john-stumpf-wells-fargo-clawback/ (last updated
Oct. 3, 2016, 4:30 PM) (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (“Wells Fargo and CEO John
Stumpf are getting beaten up like no other bank or CEO since the financial
crisis.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stacy Cowley, ‘Lions
Hunting Zebras’: Ex-Wells Fargo Bankers Describe Abuses, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/21/business/dealbook/lions-huntingzebras-ex-wells-fargo-bankers-describe-abuses.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017)
[hereinafter Cowley, Lions Hunting Zebras] (“Wells Fargo would like to close the
chapter on the sham account scandal, saying it has changed its policies,
replaced its chief executive and refunded $2.6 million to customers. But
lawmakers and regulators say they will not let it go that quickly.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo to Claw Back
$41 Million of Chief’s Pay Over Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-john-stumpfcompensation.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (“As more details emerge of how
toxic Wells Fargo’s sales culture could be—and of how many workers were fired
or punished for their attempts to draw attention to the problems they saw at
their branches—the scandal has intensified.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Matt Egan, I Called the Wells Fargo Ethics Line and Was
Fired,
CNN
MONEY
(Sept.
21,
2016,
1:26
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2016/09/21/investing/wells-fargo-fired-workers-retaliationfake-accounts/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing claims that Wells Fargo
made a practice of firing employees who reported ethical violations) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Matt Levine, Wells Fargo Opened a
Couple Million Fake Accounts, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Sept. 9, 2016, 6:30 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-09-09/wells-fargo-opened-acouple-million-fake-accounts (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing problematic
practices supposedly used by Wells Fargo to generate new accounts from
existing customers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

976

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2017)

products; the mantra was “Eight is Great.”9 Employees say that
they feared for their jobs if they did not sell the required number
of accounts, so, with their supervisors’ acquiescence, they created
accounts without the customers’ consent.10 There are allegations
that college students, Native Americans depositing their portion
of casino earnings distributed to tribe members, Mexicans
without social security numbers, and the elderly were
particularly targeted for the unauthorized accounts, presumably
on grounds that they were less likely to ask questions.11 There
are also allegations that individuals anonymously reporting the
accounts on the ethics hotline were tracked down and fired.12 The
bank was fined $185 million, 5,300 employees were fired, the
CEO resigned, and he and another top executive responsible for
the business unit involved, who had recently retired, returned
millions of dollars of compensation (although the high amounts
reported in the media may be overstated).13
What Turing did was not illegal.14 What Wells Fargo did was
illegal, but the behavior nevertheless persisted for quite a long
time, perhaps close to ten years, or even longer.15

9. See Levine, supra note 8 (describing Wells Fargo practices encouraging
the opening of unauthorized accounts); Doreen McCallister, Wells Fargo CEO
Discusses Secret-Accounts Scandal in Senate Hearing, NPR (Sep. 20, 2016, 5:26
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/20/494680201/wells-fargoceo-to-address-accounts-scandal-before-senate-panel (last visited Mar. 30, 2017)
(“When it comes to cross-selling, Wells Fargo used the slogan ‘Eight is Great.’”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
10. See McCallister, supra note 9 (“Managers often tell employees to do
whatever it takes to reach their quotas. Employees who do not reach their
quotas are often required to work hours beyond their typical work schedule
without being compensated for that extra work time, and/or are threatened with
termination.”).
11. See Cowley, Lions Hunting Zebras, supra note 8 (“They would look for
the weakest, the ones that would put up the least resistance.”).
12. See Egan, supra note 8 (discussing claims of retaliation against
whistleblowers).
13. See id. (discussing the fallout of the Wells Fargo scandal).
14. See Long, supra note 1 (“It’s not illegal what they’ve done [at Turing],
but it’s unethical and immoral.” (quoting Dr. Judith Aberg)).
15. See Egan, supra note 8 (discussing claims that the practice of opening
unauthorized accounts was of long standing).
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Four more examples help set the stage. One is casinos’
attempts to entice people the casinos know or should suspect
have gambling problems to visit their casinos. In the extreme, a
casino might even target people who had previously gone
bankrupt because of their gambling debts who then obtained
money by inheritance or otherwise, sending such people vouchers
or other enticements to visit the casino.16 A second is one
company’s business model of buying structured settlements—
amounts payable over a period of time, typically several years—
for lead paint exposures from people who had gotten such
settlements in exchange for a too-small immediate lump sum
payment,17 conduct for which the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau has sued the company.18 A third is the practice by some
plaintiffs’ law firms to identify companies that are about to
merge, advertise for plaintiffs (shareholders of the company) who
they can represent to make (arguably, quite specious) arguments
that the merger disclosure was inaccurate, and then push for and
accept a settlement in which the company adds some small
disclosures, the officers and directors of the company get an
expansive release, and the lawyers get a significant payoff for
their trouble.19 A final example is some medical providers’ (eye
doctors and dentists, mostly) practice of visiting nursing homes
16. See John Rosengren, How Casinos Enable Gambling Addicts, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 2016), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/losing-itall/505814/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing strategies used by casinos to
encourage gambling) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
17. See Terrence McCoy, How Companies Make Millions Off
Lead-Poisoned, Poor Blacks, WASH. POST, (Aug. 25, 2015), (last visited Mar. 30,
2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/how-companies-makemillions-off-lead-poisoned-poor-blacks/2015/08/25/7460c1de-0d8c-11e5-972649d6fa26a8c6_story.html?utm_term=.95ebba6c9f87 (last visited May 2, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. CFPB Sues Access Funding for Scamming Lead-Paint Poisoning
Victims Out of Settlement Money, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Nov. 21,
2016),
[hereinafter
CFPB
Sues
Access
Funding]
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-access-fundingscamming-lead-paint-poisoning-victims-out-settlement-money/ (last visited May
2, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical
Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015); Sean J. Griffith,
Correcting Corporate Benefit, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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and getting incompetent patients’ relatives to approve ambitious
treatment plans for unnecessary medical care that would be
largely or exclusively paid for with government funds.20
All these examples are of business practices that, it seems
fair to say, elicit strong negative reactions. In some cases, the
practices are illegal but in many cases, they are in a grey area, or
are even legal—albeit quite undesirable from a societal
perspective. I wondered whether additional forces could be
marshaled against these types of practices, preferably before they
were able to cause much harm. This Essay provides my starting
suggestion as to how to proceed; I will develop the ideas in detail
in a longer piece. The hope is to develop and define a concept—
“Repugnant Business Models”—and try to make it salient, such
that it could be used to pressure companies to represent that they
were not using such models (or were using their best efforts not
to use such models), and to explain the steps they were taking to
assure that result. Critically, the pressure would not be to a
binary end, just as Repugnant Business Models is not a binary
concept. Turing’s price increase might make a lesser, but still
high, price increase less outrage-inducing.21 Companies should be
pressured to examine whether they are using a business model or
engaging in practices intended to “take advantage” (of patients
needing
life-saving
drugs,
of
gambling
addicts,
of
doctor-venerating relatives of incompetent patients, etc.).

20. See Peter Eisler & Barbara Hansen, Doctors Perform Thousands of
Unnecessary
Surgeries,
USA
TODAY
(June
19,
2013),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/18/unnecessary-surgeryusa-today-investigation/2435009/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (describing
unnecessary surgeries performed by doctors) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Katie Lobosco, Doctors and Nurses Busted for $712 Million
Medicare
Fraud,
CNN
MONEY
(Jun.
21,
2015,
2:50
PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/19/pf/medicare-fraud-doctors/ (last visited Mar.
30, 2017) (discussing fraudulent practices targeting vulnerable populations) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Note that much of what is
written is about practices that are illegal but enforcement is difficult. The
practice described in the text—which I personally encountered—certainly
violates the spirit of the law, but does not violate the letter of the law.
21. I thank Peter Krause for pointing out that a visceral example of
repugnance might inspire other companies to take advantage of the high bar
thus set to seem less repugnant by comparison.

REPUGNANT BUSINESS MODELS

979

The pressure might, for public companies, take the form of
shareholder proposals or SEC disclosure requirements. Perhaps
shareholders or state attorneys general could be allowed to bring
lawsuits against companies for employing Repugnant Business
Models? Lawmakers and policymakers might also feel pressured
to act—to close loopholes (which is arguably what was at issue
with Daraprim), counter influential interest groups (at issue in
other repugnant pharmaceutical industry practices), or beef up
enforcement (which could have uncovered the Wells Fargo
situation sooner, perhaps by looking expressly for too-aggressive
and unrealistic sales targets), for instance. In appropriate cases,
judges could, in dicta, encourage (or regulators, in deferred
prosecution agreements or nonprosecution agreements, could
require) companies to take steps to ensure they were not using
Repugnant Business Models. Courts or lawmakers might broaden
the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to allow recourse to
shareholders’ personal assets where their corporation’s business
model effectively took advantage of the corporate form, using the
corporation to externalize harms from Repugnant Business
Models and “organized [and maintained] with capital insufficient
to meet liabilities which are certain to arise in the ordinary
course of the corporation’s business.”22
The Repugnant Business Model concept is intended to have
both reputational and legal force. Most companies care about
their reputations, and shaming might cause them to examine
their practices. Those that do not, such as companies whose
entire business model is premised on such models, would
presumably care about potentially increased costs and sanctions
from lawmakers and courts.
This Essay and the broader project have another and
perhaps seemingly contradictory aim: to suggest that outrage
against some other business models is in fact misplaced. I will
argue, for instance, that Uber’s surge pricing during popular
times unwarrantedly elicits outrage. This outrage led to legal
restrictions in some jurisdictions.23
22. Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 427 (N.Y. 1966). I thank
Randall Thomas for this suggestion.
23. See Danielle Muoio, Uber’s Surge Pricing Was Just Banned in the
World’s Second-Largest City, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2016, 11:57 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-can-no-longer-offer-surge-pricing-in-delhi-
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This aim is, though, less contradictory than it might appear.
If everything induces outrage, outrage loses its force. I argue here
that there can be a principled articulation of the conditions under
which outrage is, and is not, warranted. Such an articulation
should make outrage a more effective force for advancing society’s
interests.
In all, I will distinguish between three types of business
models: Repugnant Business Models generally elicit, and
warrant, pure outrage. Another category involves models which
elicit some outrage, but the outrage reflects a societal clash in
values. One common clash is between paternalism and autonomy.
Another involves the extent to which disadvantaged people
should be able to get health care, housing, food, or other
“necessities” at societal expense, and more generally, what
disparities in access to “necessities” is appropriate and what the
“haves” owe to the greater society.
To illustrate the paternalism vs. autonomy clash, consider
potentially differing reactions to the physical features of many
casinos. The casinos seek to disorient patrons by having no
windows, carpets with elaborate patterns, and very few clocks.
People are, one could say, being tricked into spending more time
in casinos and presumably, gambling more. But aren’t people
responsible for resisting such lures? Clashes implicating differing
views about the consequences of inequality and the
responsibilities of good citizens are so obvious and frequent as to
scarcely need illustrations, but one interesting example warrants
mention: outrage over surge pricing for transportation when the
increased demand causing the surge relates to a natural disaster
(or an “unnatural” disaster such as terrorism). Should Uber, as a
2016-4 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (noting New Delhi banned Uber’s surge
pricing) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Will
Brunelle & Dana Rubinstein, Bill Would Ban ‘Surge Pricing’ by Uber, Rideshare
Services, POLITICO (Feb. 13, 2015, 5:34 AM), http://www.politico.com/states/newyork/albany/story/2015/02/bill-would-ban-surge-pricing-by-uber-rideshare-serv
ices-086949 (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (discussing efforts to ban surge pricing
in New York) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Liam Dillon,
California Bill Seeking to Limit Surge Pricing by Uber and Lyft Dies, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2016, 7:12 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-essentialpoli-uber-and-lyft-surge-pricing-bill-dies-1461112198-htmlstory.html
(last
visited Mar. 30, 2017) (detailing failed efforts to ban surge pricing in California)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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matter of good civic citizenship, pay drivers a premium that is not
passed along to passengers if those passengers are fleeing a
hurricane?
My third category is models that, in my view, elicit
unwarranted outrage, such as surge pricing during popular
times. There is much more to be said about these examples and
categories, of course. In this Essay, I can only sketch out some of
the principal delineations and arguments.
Ultimately, what motivates this Essay (and the larger project
that will further develop the ideas) is my view that attempts to
influence corporate behavior, including those made by
lawmakers, but to a greater extent through extra-legal means,
are too often based on fads and people’s “agendas,” rather than
from a principled consideration of what corporations should and
should not be doing. Better-focused pressure can and should be
brought to bear on corporate actors as well as government actors.
In many cases, I would argue for more pressure. In other cases, I
would argue for less. And in some cases, where the issues may be
intractable, the society would benefit from a reasoned discussion
that acknowledges differences in first principles leading to
resolutions that many find outrageous, but that are quite
acceptable to others.
II. Defining Repugnant Business Models
Consider a “perfect” transaction, one involving a willing,
informed buyer with full capacity to contract. Even better, the
seller would be a repeat player or otherwise have a considerable
reputational stake in the transaction. Many transactions do not
meet that ideal, but some are, of course, far further from it than
others. Repugnant Business Models are those that are designed
to take advantage—either of people under duress, people who are
particularly vulnerable (and to which the society may be
solicitous), third parties, or some combination thereof, or of a
legal privilege, for a reason that violates the spirit of the law. The
word “designed” in this formulation means that the
advantage-taking is intended.24 A model for this purpose can be a
24.

I owe this observation to Francis Shen.
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company’s principal business—its ‘raison d’être’—or it can simply
be one business or practice of many.
The determination is also not binary. There are degrees of
taking advantage, and there are degrees of intention. A person
who needs a lifesaving drug urgently when no alternatives exist
is arguably more amenable to being taken advantage of than a
person who became bankrupt because of gambling losses and now
is being tempted with free gambling chips to visit a casino. (Or,
perhaps, the two are equally amenable to being taken advantage
of, but society should be more solicitous of the person needing the
drug?) A CEO who knows perfectly well that her “lifesaving” drug
is worthless has more of an intention to take advantage than one
who simply has anecdotal evidence that the drug might work, but
has not had testing done that might support, or disprove, the
drug’s efficacy. Taken to its extreme, the application of this
concept could be truly ludicrous, extending to practices that, in
my view, absolutely should not be considered repugnant: a
company spends a lot of money making a wonderful product, the
(high) price of which reflects its development costs, and it
becomes a “must have” product for everyone, including people
who then “have” to “sacrifice” necessities to obtain it. The iPhone
may be an example. I discuss later in this Essay how to
characterize outrage in this context: as reflecting a clash in
values among people in the society as to what a baseline standard
of living should consist of, and how much higher a standard of
living money should be able to buy.
My project requires very difficult, and contestable,
distinctions. It is important (albeit quite difficult) to distinguish
between raising the price of a lifesaving generic drug one has
acquired the rights to sell, and recouping the price of a lifesaving
drug one has recently and at great expense developed. In the first
case, the model in this formulation consists of the acquisition of
the generic drug with the intent of significantly raising its price;
in the second case, the model is both the development and sale of
the drug. The consumers in both cases are just as desperate (and
hence “under duress”). But many would agree with the
characterization that the former is an abuse of the law, while the
latter is the law’s intended and desired goal. The latter is not
“taking advantage” while the former arguably is.
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The Repugnant Business Model concept will require a
systematic definition. Among the likely sources are contract law
and other forms of consumer protection law. In both types of law,
contracts can in some circumstances be found unenforceable.
Contract law, for instance, provides that contracts entered into or
modified under duress, contracts made with parties who are
incompetent, contracts that are unconscionable (meaning,
generally, that the terms are extremely unfavorable to one party,
typically a type of party to which the law is solicitous), contracts
where a party is exerting undue influence or attempting to
impose an “unfair” term on the other party, may be
unenforceable.25 Most of the examples in this Essay involve
something in the general family of duress, incompetence, or
undue influence, but there are examples tracking these other
doctrines as well.
That being said, the concept of Repugnant Business Models
needs to also encompass certain third party harms, such as the
government paying for unnecessary health care. Law does not
have an express category or particular label for third party
harms, but such harms are a familiar focus of law. Tax is a
particularly frequent context: the obvious third party is the
government, which is losing out on revenue to which it is
arguably entitled, due to actions by a person and her tax adviser.
When the government allocates money to pay for health care for
senior citizens, the money is supposed to go towards improving
the life of such citizens, not lining the pockets of providers who
have finagled their way into providing unnecessary services.
When the law contemplates a settlement between lawyers
purportedly representing the two sides in a dispute, neither side
is supposed to be in a position to advance its own interests while
harming the interests of its supposed client.
Let us apply this rough definition of intentionally taking
advantage to the examples above. The first example involved
25. See, e.g., CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE,
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 533–667 (7th ed., 2012) (discussing principles in
contract law under which enforcement of a contract can be denied, such as
incapacity, bargaining misconduct, unconscionability, and public policy). There
is also precedent, such as “anti-abuse” rules and regulations in various contexts,
for the form of a transaction not to be respected, a subject that will be more fully
developed in the detailed exposition of these ideas.
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Daraprim. The problem is not just the high price—after all, as
noted above, a critical point of the patent system is to motivate
innovation by allowing the innovator to be handsomely
rewarded.26 Many new drugs cost a great deal, which may be
controversial when the price is particularly high, but, at least
until recently, often has not been.27 The problem is that the
innovation at issue in the Daraprim case was in the distant past,
Daraprim was no longer under patent, and Turing was exploiting
a regulatory “glitch”—even generic drugs require a form of FDA
approval, which Daraprim already had, but other potential
manufacturers did not.28 Because the approval is time consuming,
at the lower price, other manufacturers had not found the
approval worthwhile to obtain.29 The other companies now
promising to bring the drug to market more cheaply were
“compounding” pharmacies, which are allowed to make drugs
using pre-approved compounds, for specialized uses.30
26. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1580 (2003) (“There is virtually unanimous agreement that the
purpose of the patent system is to promote innovation by granting exclusive
rights to encourage invention.”).
27. See, e.g., Carolyn Y. Johnson, $300,000 a year? Doctors Question High
Drug Prices for Rare Diseases, BOSTON GLOBE MEDIA PARTNERS (Oct. 1, 2013,
6:03
PM),
http://archive.boston.com/news/science/blogs/science-inmind/2013/10/01/year-doctors-question-high-drug-prices-for-rarediseases/rJwjMUXTyTFWkkDt lj5dxJ/blog.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017)
(noting the high cost of many new drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
28. See John Graham, Martin Shkreli a Creature of FDA Regulation, Not
Pharma
Industry’s
Greed,
FORBES
(Sep.
28,
2015,
5:17
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2015/09/28/martin-shkreli-is-acreature-of-fda-regulation-not-pharma-industrys-greed (last visited Mar. 30,
2017) (discussing the price impact of the FDA approval process for generic
drugs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. See id. (noting the lack of other generic alternatives).
30. See Ramsey, supra note 1 (discussing the use of compounding
pharmacies). Another very similar example involves the EpiPen, a device for
delivering epinephrine to someone in the throes of an allergic attack. See
generally Gretchen Morgenson, EpiPen Price Rises Could Mean More Riches for
Mylan Executives, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/04/business/at-mylan-lets-pretend-is-more-than-a-game.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2017) (describing price increase of EpiPen) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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The pharmaceutical industry offers many other examples. A
notorious practice in the industry involves a product about to lose
patent protection that is slightly tweaked so that it can be
re-patented and gain exclusivity for several more years.31 Yet
another practice, now illegal, is for a patent holder of an expiring
patent to pay a potential generic manufacturer to delay producing
the product so that the patent holder can retain exclusivity
beyond the patent period.32 These examples are also of “taking
advantage,” here of a system intended to motivate innovation, but
instead being used to get higher prices. And we can consider who
is being taken advantage of in such cases—the consumer, the
government, the private insurer, etc. The unnecessary health
care example takes advantage of a third party—the
government—which is paying for the health care in question. I
would argue that it takes advantage of the patients as well,
especially insofar as the health care may be painful and even
dangerous. A safeguard against the provision of the unnecessary
care exists under law: approval must be obtained from
“competent” individuals authorized to consent on behalf of the
party lacking capacity. But, in my view, the safeguard does not
suffice. The individuals will not infrequently be cowed by medical
personnel, agreeing to what has been “recommended.” I would
wager a considerable amount that the dentists proposing
extensive painful dental work for patients who are not in pain
and who are in the last years of their lives would not recommend
such work for their own close relatives. Intuition strongly argues
that the model is a paradigmatic example of the category: a
business model that is designed to take advantage, and that
would not make sense but for taking advantage.
31. See TOM COTTER, PATENT WARS: HOW PATENT DISPUTES IMPACT OUR
DAILY LIVES (forthcoming 2017) (discussing patenting minor improvements on
drugs to extend patent protection).
32. See Marc-André Gagnon, Corruption of Pharmaceutical Markets:
Addressing the Misalignment of Financial Incentives and Public Health, 41 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 571 (2013) (discussing problems posed by combining profit
driven private industry and public health needs); Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michelle
M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Strategies and Practices in Off-Label Marketing
of Pharmaceuticals: A Retrospective Analysis of Whistleblower Complaints, 8
PLOS MED. e1000431 (2011) (discussing off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals);
see also generally TOM COTTER, supra note 31 (providing background about
tactics used to delay ANDA applications and antitrust implications).

986

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 973 (2017)

The structured settlement purchases involve a very similar
mechanism. They must by law be approved by someone
“independent,” but the law has not proven effective in ensuring
that nominal independence is true independence. The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau has charged that “Access Funding [a
company in the business of buying these settlements] steered
victims to receive ‘independent advice’ from a sham advisor, an
attorney who was actually paid directly by the company and
indicated to consumers that the transactions required little
scrutiny.”33
The casino example is similar in important respects. Yes, the
person receiving inducements to gamble has not been declared
incompetent, but the person is known to be someone with a
gambling addiction and who has lost considerable amounts of
money that he almost certainly could not afford to lose. Sending a
letter with free gambling chips and other inducements to gamble
to someone who went bankrupt on account of gambling debts is
surely an attempt to take advantage of a well-known
vulnerability. As I discuss below, trying to make such conduct
illegal risks overreaching and encountering vehement objections
on grounds of paternalism—which is precisely why an approach
based on extra-legal pressure might be indicated.
Let us consider two other examples involving what Richard
Painter and I have called financial maneuvering, which is an
attempt to do an end-run around financial regulations or
covenants.34 One is Enron’s attempt, using various
investment-bank crafted techniques, to vastly understate the
amount of debt it had.35 The other is Goldman Sachs’ creation of a
cross-currency swap that enabled Greece to understate its debt so
as to meet the requirements to adopt the Euro.36 The parties that
33.
34.

CFPB Sues Access Funding, supra note 18.
See CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER
BANKS 66 (2015) (identifying financial maneuvering as a form of financial
engineering “intended to deceive or subvert a regulatory scheme or contractual
obligation”).
35. See id. at 66 (“Enron used many bank-crafted techniques to create a
wholly false financial appearance, intending to deceive the market into thinking
it was far healthier than it was.”).
36. See id. (“In Goldman’s cross-currency swap with Greece, there was an
EU regulation intended to limit Greece’s debt level, which Goldman apparently
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were hurt in these cases were third parties—indeed, in both
cases, the two parties to the transaction were getting precisely
what they bargained for.37 And the legality of what was
contracted for is complicated—unlike in the case with Wells
Fargo, where the conduct was clearly illegal but apparently not
stopped for a long time, this conduct is close to the line for many
reasons, including, in the case of the Greek cross-currency swap,
jurisdictional reasons.38
Where is law in all this? Where should law be in all this?
These are very difficult and weighty questions that warrant
further exposition. For present purposes, I make two points.
First, the conduct at issue in Repugnant Business Models would,
by most metrics, seem “as bad” as conduct that is illegal, and
many of the rationales for making conduct illegal would apply to
Repugnant Business Models. In some cases, what is at issue are
negative externalities, a well-recognized and accepted reason for
law. In others, it is some combination of paternalism and
externalities—the bankrupt gambler and his family now have to
rely on public assistance. In some cases, it may be a case of fixing
a problem that law itself created—a loophole, for instance—that
allows patent protection for far longer than was intended or is
needed. The law—granting patent protection—intended to
interfere with markets for a good reason, but it was used to allow
interference even absent that reason. More broadly, improving
the workings of markets is seen as a plausible rationale for law,
and many Repugnant Business Models interfere with markets.
helped Greece to effectively subvert.”).
37. See id. at 66–68 (identifying third parties as the primary group
harmed).
38. Yet another example is private prisons. Governments want to save
money by privatizing prisons. They would like to assure quality, but doing so is
quite difficult, especially where the companies’ incentives are deeply perverse:
they want more prisoners serving longer sentences and want to spend the
smallest amount of money possible on them. Governments are hard pressed to
monitor to overcome these incentives. This problem has been recognized for
quite a long time. See generally Oliver Hart, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny,
The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons, 112 Q.J.
ECON. 1127 (1997) (discussing reasons why certain services should be provided
by governments, and certain other public services can be contracted out to third
party providers). Note that it is the prisoners as well as the broader society on
whom the costs are being foisted. Id.
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The examples are those we have seen before: transactions
involving fraud or duress or undue influence or taking advantage
of diminished capacity.
Second, in some cases, it is plausible to say that the conduct
would be effectively addressed by law but for certain obstacles,
such as difficulties in specification, difficulties in enforcement,
and failures of political will. Specification is always a challenge.
Attempts at greater precision, in the form of rules, provide road
maps for evasion. But the standard alternative to rules,
standards, are also problematic, allowing too-expansive use of
law, and corroding law’s legitimacy. Consider trying to specify
what sorts of medical care could be recommended for people near
the end of life. Process-based solutions may be employed, but they
are amenable to the same problems as are rules: the cowed
relative approving the unnecessary health care, and the
“independent” person approving the fairness of the structured
settlement purchase.
Enforcement is also difficult, with nimbler and better
resourced-businesses prevailing over (less nimble and
under-resourced) regulators (often, in the notorious “whack a
mole”). Problems of political will arise when it’s clear that the
status quo does some harm and could be improved upon, but
powerful interests benefit from the status quo and block any
changes. The problem of new patents granted on slightly tweaked
versions of old drugs losing patent protection could easily be
remedied by a requirement that the new drug do something
useful that the previous drug did not.39 Among the hoped-for
strengths of the approach I suggest here is an increase in
pressure that could counter a lack of political will, and, more
broadly, pressure that could make the search for loopholes as a
business model more reputationally costly. One recent salutary
development, involving a legal solution to the problems posed by
a particular Repugnant Business Model, is the new judicial
hostility in Delaware to disclosure-only settlements granting
defendants, corporate officers and directors, broad releases from
liability in exchange for some trivial increased disclosure and a

39.

I owe this example to Lisa Larrimore Ouellette.
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big check to plaintiffs’ lawyers.40 After hearing convincing
demonstrations that these settlements were pernicious, the
courts became far less apt to approve them.41 Of course, the result
might be that, at least in the short term, the litigation somehow
manages to move to other jurisdictions. Hopefully, the concept of
Repugnant Business Models can complement those courts’
consideration of the issues when they arise.
III. Other Types of Business Models
Models that do not fit into my Repugnant Business Models
category also sometimes elicit outrage. I consider two such
models. I make no claim to being comprehensive, but I believe
these models go a significant way to covering the relevant terrain.
The first model elicits outrage because of an underlying
conflict in values. The conflict that can be articulated most
straightforwardly is between paternalism and autonomy. How
much should the society protect people from themselves, and how
much are people chargeable with protecting themselves? What
happens when protecting some people increases costs for those
not in need of protection? Recall the perfect transaction with
which the Repugnant Business Models were contrasted—the
well-informed, fully competent buyer, and perhaps, a seller with a
significant reputational stake. Many of the transactions in the
Repugnant category had buyers who were under duress or
particularly vulnerable.42 In these conflict of values models, the
buyers’ foibles are far less extreme—the buyers may, for instance,
be “too easily” tempted. The gambling addict is of course a hard
40. See generally Matt Chiappardi, Meet the Man Changing Deal Litigation
As We Know It, LAW360 (Apr. 19, 2016)
https://www.law360.com/articles/785037/meet-the-man-changing-deal-litigationas-we-know-it (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); Edward B. Micheletti, Jeness E. Parker & Bonnie W. David,
Forward Momentum: Trulia Continues to Impact Resolution of Deal Litigation
in Delaware and Beyond, SKADDEN (Nov. 17, 2017),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/forward-momentum-trulia-continues-impactresolution-deal-litigation-delaware-and-beyond (last visited May 1, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
41. Id.
42. Infra Part II.
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case—my fuzzy attempt at demarcation characterizes a direct
lure to identified addicts being repugnant, while a softer lure that
is made more broadly is characterized as being in the conflict
category. Any principled attempt the society made to be more
solicitous to people on grounds of how tempted they can be (allow
themselves to be?) would quickly lead to objections of excessive
paternalism. Many people might want our society to be more
paternalistic, but many people very much do not.
One example in this category is the production, sale, and
marketing of hyper-palatable foods, now that the foods are known
to mute natural signals of satiation and otherwise contribute to
significant overeating and unhealthy diets.43 Another is
marketing expensive “status” sneakers, especially to populations
without much disposable income.44 Many other examples can be
given, such as payday loans and other very expensive ways for
people without much money to acquire money quickly.45 Yet other
examples include supersizing options for fast food meals, or, as
discussed earlier, casinos’ use of disorienting carpets to get
would-be gamblers to lose track of time and place.46 (What about
the carpet manufacturer making the carpets expressly for casinos
and knowing their purpose? Their model would probably fit into
this category as well.)
One term that covers some of the examples in the
paternalism versus autonomy category is “bad nudges.” The
43. See generally MICHAEL MOSS, SALT SUGAR FAT: HOW THE FOOD GIANTS
HOOKED US (paperback ed. 2014) (discussing techniques used by food
manufacturers to make food more addictive).
44. See Emily Chertoff, The Racial Divide on . . . Sneakers, ATLANTIC (Aug.
20,
2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/08/the-racialdivide-on-sneakers/261256/ (last visited May 1, 2017) (describing the
prominence of status sneakers in low-income African American communities)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
45. See Megan McArdle, On Poverty, Interest Rates, and Payday Loans,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
18,
2009),
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2009/11/on-poverty-interest-ratesand-payday-loans/30431/ (last visited May, 2017) (discussing high interest and
fee financing options targeted toward low-income communities) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
46. See generally NATASHA DOW SCHULL, ADDICTION BY DESIGN (2013)
(describing techniques used by casinos to get people to gamble more money and
for longer periods of time).
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concept of “nudges” was originated by Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein in their seminal 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. 47 As the title suggests, the
book focuses on “good nudges”—nudges that encourage behavior
that society desires and, they argue, individuals “really” desire
too, such as make healthier food choices.48 For example, fruit,
rather than candy, might be placed near cash registers at
supermarkets, encouraging impulse purchases of fruit and
discouraging impulse purchases of candy. Bad nudges, by
contrast, are manipulations of buyers by self-interested sellers.49
An example is a “free” one month trial magazine subscription
that includes an automatic renewal at the regular price, where
the procedures to cancel the subscription are buried in fine
print.50
Words used to describe the models at issue sometimes are
quite charged—“exploitation,” for instance—and there is an
interesting linguistic ambiguity in the word that is not
accidental. Is a business practice of having casino employees
looking for gamblers seated at a slot machine who are showing
47. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). Thaler and Sunstein advocate
good nudges, “non-coercive” ways of getting people to make better decisions. Id.
But they have noted that there are bad nudges as well. Id. A paradigmatically
bad nudge would attempt to covertly manipulate a buyer, for the benefit of the
seller, giving the buyer little ability to opt out. Id. Admittedly, the word
“manipulation” is charged, and quite difficult to define rigorously and other than
conclusorily. But the concept may nevertheless have sufficient traction.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Sunstein and Thaler argued that “nudges” achieved aims that might be
considered paternalistic while not being paternalistic. Indeed, the concept was
originally called “libertarian paternalism,” which the authors characterized as
“anti-anti paternalism.” See generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein,
Libertarian Paternalism, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 175 (2003). Some have argued that
nudges (good or bad) actually can or do undermine autonomy. See, e.g.,
Christopher McCrudden & Jeff King, The Dark Side of Nudging: The Ethics,
Political Economy, and Law of Libertarian Paternalism, QUEEN’S U. (2015)
http://pure.qub.ac.uk/ portal/en/publications/the-dark-side-of-nudging(062809e127c2-4ce5-b742-bbc0a 517fb32)/export.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This is not the place to air the
debate fully, but for present purposes, suffice it to say stark oppositions between
paternalism and autonomy in principle and in practice may be difficult to
articulate fully satisfactorily, which has added to the muddle of this category.
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signs of hunger and bringing the people meals so they will not
stop gambling exploitative? (And if so, what follows?) How about
using a technique to determine a person’s preferred resistance
from the gambling lever, and automatically setting the device to
that resistance? (Both practices are described in the book
Addiction by Design,51 as are the disorienting carpets mentioned
above, lack of windows, and lack of clocks, all to discourage easy
exit from the casino.) What about the Heart Attack Grill, a
restaurant in Las Vegas that has “courted controversy by serving
high-calorie menu items with deliberately provocative names
coupled with waitresses in sexually provocative clothing?”52
Complicating matters, people not protected from themselves
may inflict costs on third parties—people who spend all their
money gambling may leave their households impoverished, and
people who eat too much unhealthy food may have higher health
costs borne by others. To what extent business models which
allow for or encourage these behaviors should be discouraged, and
by what means, are important questions—what is critical for my
purposes is to distinguish the models at issue from repugnant
business models. One very difficult-to-classify example is the
attempts by investment banks just before the financial crisis to
unload their toxic securities onto “sophisticated” money managers
who had sympathetic beneficiaries, sometimes the proverbial
widows and orphans—or at least pension recipients—who,
admittedly, had entrusted their funds to the wrong people.
Should societal solicitousness extend that far? Perhaps the
answer is yes given the extent to which the greater society
suffered harms. Perhaps what tips this into Repugnant territory
51. SCHULL, supra note 46.
52. Heart Attack Grill, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heart_
Attack_Grill (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see also We’ll Make Reporting Easy for You . . . , HEART ATTACK
GRILL, http://www.heartattackgrill.com/press.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2017)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Speaking of sexually
provocative clothing, where in my categorization does Hooters belong? I would
say that paternalism is not what is at issue (although many people with
different world views would disagree, saying that people “should” be saved from
pornography). There is an argument that it causes negative externalities insofar
as the society, and especially many women, may suffer from the results of the
message Hooters conveys. But of course all this turns on highly contested priors
as to all these matters, something I readily acknowledge.

REPUGNANT BUSINESS MODELS

993

is the deliberate strategy to sell to investors who could be duped,
even though the investors’ nominal sophistication meant that the
law did not give them the protections they would have been
accorded had they not qualified as sophisticated.53
Other conflicts relate to disparities between people, mostly
those involving income and wealth. What is the baseline standard
of living to which all citizens are entitled? Should a lifesaving
innovation only be available to the very wealthy? These conflicts
reflect disagreements on first principles and on related empirical
matters. The point warrants, and in the longer exposition of the
argument will get, far more exposition, but for present purposes,
consider different views as to why poor people are poor. If
somebody thinks that a person is poor because of indolence, they
are far less likely to think the person should be supplied with
food, housing, and health care at government expense than
someone who thinks people who are poor are unlucky or
discriminated against and not responsible for their financial
difficulties. (People’s prior beliefs as to whether government is
good at addressing problems are also at issue—some people think
government works far better than others do.) A final related clash
of values concerns the responsibilities of citizenship. If there is a
natural disaster or terrorist attack from which citizens need to
escape, do private transportation companies and their employees
have an obligation not to benefit from the increased demand for
their services?
The final category elicits what in my view is unwarranted
outrage. My paradigmatic example is surge pricing, such as
Uber’s surge pricing for cars on popular evenings.

53.
In a December 28[, 2006] email discussing a list of customers to
target for the year, Goldman’s Fabrice Tourre, then a vice president
on the structured product correlation trading desk [who is now best
known for his role in the Abacus transaction], said to ‘focus efforts’ on
‘buy and hold rating-based buyers’ rather than ‘sophisticated hedge
funds’ that ‘will be on the same side of the trade as we will.’ The
‘same side of the trade’ as Goldman was the selling or shorting side—
those who expected the mortgage market to continue to decline.
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 235–
36 (2011).
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The business models and practices in this category are, in my
view, unobjectionable. But they elicit outrage for what I will
characterize as self-serving reasons, often “shooting the
messenger.” Somebody wants to go out on an evening on which
there will be high demand for Uber cars, but low supply. Uber’s
business model includes getting more drivers on the road by
offering the drivers more money. People somehow feel an
entitlement to the same price at all times (even though I expect
they would be fine with a discounted price under certain
circumstances—to take people to religious services, hospitals, or
funerals?). Thus, the ride costing more at peak times is
objectionable, and the messenger, the company that sets the
higher price, is behaving outrageously. Status quo bias is a factor
here, as it is with business models in this category more
generally: the outrage arises when there is a change in what
people had come to feel entitled to.
A related example is when a company unbundles services
that had previously been bundled. Someone used to getting a free
meal on the plane, or checking luggage for free, now has to pay.54
If asked why people who do not want the meal should have to pay
for people who do, a person might respond, “This is just the
airline’s way of raising prices.” In particular cases, it could be
true (and might especially be believed by someone who thinks of
business as trying to gouge its customers and generally take
advantage whenever it can) but unbundling as a principle seems
hard to argue with.
Another example concerns outsourcing to countries with
cheaper labor.55 A person who thinks the practice is odious is free
54. See Christopher Elliott, By Unbundling, Airlines Make a Bundle, WASH.
POST (Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/04/01/AR2010040103315.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing
unbundling of services in the airline industry) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
55. See, e.g., Barbara Brotman, Chicago Activist Begins Oreo Boycott to
Protest Mondelez Layoff Plans, CHI. TRIBUNE
(Aug. 9, 2015),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/columnists/ct-oreos-brotman-talk-081020150806-column.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (describing one woman’s
mission to boycott Mondelez, the company who manufactures Oreo, for moving
jobs to Mexico) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also
Daniel Roberts, Here’s Why Donald Trump is Giving Up Oreo Cookies, FORTUNE
(Aug. 26, 2015, 6:37 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/donald-trump-oreos/
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to only purchase products made with higher-priced labor. A
person who continues to purchase the cheap-labor products
notwithstanding her objection to the practice has available a
variety of narratives. Some seem to me principled—they “can’t
afford” the higher prices, for example. But what of people who
argue against the practice but continue to buy the products,
arguing that companies should simply have lower profit margins
or the executives should be paid less? I am not arguing that the
present profit margins or executive compensation levels are
somehow inviolate (although I suspect that even much lower
executive compensation would not yield the cost savings at issue).
The point, instead, is that the outrage reflects a fact about the
world (and perhaps themselves) that is uncomfortable, and the
outrage, I think, reflects an attempt to resolve the discomfort in a
manner that may complicate the operation of markets.
Another type of example can be introduced by describing a
famous Kurt Vonnegut story published in 1961, Harrison
Bergeron.56 The story begins: “The year was 2081, and everybody
was finally equal. They weren’t only equal before God and the
law. They were equal every which way. Nobody was smarter than
anybody else. Nobody was better looking than anybody else.
Nobody was stronger or quicker than anybody else.”57 A dance
performance in this society is described as follows: “They weren’t
really very good—no better than anybody else would have been,
anyway. They were burdened with sashweights and bags of
birdshot, and their faces were masked, so that no one, seeing a
free and graceful gesture or a pretty face, would feel like
something the cat drug in.”58
The story conjures up a society in which equalization of
talents, looks, and material resources was attempted on a grand
scale.59 The subject is quite an uncomfortable one, and, in our
(last visited May 1, 2017) (discussing Donald Trump’s boycott of Oreo cookies
because manufacturer Mondelez was moving Chicago plant jobs to Mexico) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE MONKEY
HOUSE 7 (1968).
57. Id. at 7.
58. Id. at 8.
59. See id. at 7–13 (depicting a world in which people’s superior attributes
are equalized through handicaps).
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world, the discomfort manifests itself in various contexts. For
instance, a woman with various canonically desirable attributes
(appearance, youth, intelligence) could sell her eggs for more than
a woman with fewer of those attributes.60 (Getting into “hot
nightspots” is also easier for people who are more attractive). One
hears objections—that such people “should not” get these
advantages over others. The same is true as to other desirable
attributes that are, as all such attributes are, unevenly
distributed. But people are often not consistent on this front.
Nobody begrudges a beautiful movie star having many choices
among highly desirable suitors. Society tolerates many
inequalities, and—to get very provocative—some people who
object to others’ advantages may feel quite entitled to their own.61
Note that this category overlaps with the clash of values category
insofar as it relates to advantages accruing to unevenly possessed
attributes, and clearly, there is no bright line separating the two.
I know people who very much disagree with many of the
examples I will give. For instance, if a seller (say, Amazon) knows
so much about you that they know precisely how much you are
willing to pay for some good or service, is it problematic if they
use that knowledge to get you to pay a bit more than the price
they might charge someone else? Or is the relationship a game in
which they have too many advantages, so that you should be able
to frustrate their attempts to figure out your preferences enough
to “exploit” you? And does it make a difference if there are
mechanisms by which you can “conceal” your past purchases, and
thus information about yourself, but do not do so? But, putting

60. See Jacoba Urist, How Much Should a Women be Paid for Her Eggs?,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2015/11/
how-much-should-a-woman-be-paid-for-her-eggs/414142/ (last visited May 1,
2017) (noting higher prices paid for eggs from women with “desirable” traits) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. The concept of moral dumbfounding may be relevant here, at least by
analogy. See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND (2012) (providing
background on moral dumbfounding). Moral dumbfounding is what happens
when a person has a moral position that some behavior is wrong for a particular
reason, but, when shown that the reason she gave is inapplicable, she still sticks
to the position. Id. I suspect that a comparable phenomenon would occur if
people were asked to give principled moral reasons in the contexts I describe
here.
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aside the specifics, the general category is one I hope will
resonate.
IV. How (and Why) Would the Mechanism(s) for Repugnant
Business Models Work?
In a sense, the concept of Repugnant Business Models is the
easiest of the three. A search for “most hated man on Earth”
would, for quite a few months, have yielded many hits for “Martin
Shkreli.” But, even assuming, heroically, that I succeeded in
establishing the concept of Repugnant Business Models and
making it salient, how could doing so serve to reduce such
models?
The mechanisms I have described are mostly extra-legal, or
involve the law in an attenuated or indirect way. One possibility I
have mentioned for public companies is shareholder proposals to
ask boards to consider putting in place steps to assure that their
companies are not using Repugnant Business Models, and
identifying what those steps are.62 Another is a disclosure
requirement to the same end in public filings.63 Objections are
easy to anticipate: more expense for companies but no
substantive result, except perhaps in the case of disclosure
requirements, a bad one, enriching plaintiffs’ lawyers who would
find some supposed defect in the disclosure. The objection that a
disclosure requirement would “inspire” costly opportunistic
litigation by plaintiffs’ lawyers is one I take very seriously. The
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs after corporations were required to
make disclosures on pay in connection with the newly required
say-on-pay vote were in my view opportunistic and of no benefit
to companies or their shareholders.64 Either of two solutions are
possible and should solve the problem: either companies would
62. Supra Part 0.
63. Supra Part 0.
64. See generally Kevin LaCroix, Enough Said Yet?: Say on Pay Litigation
May
Have
Had
Its
Day,
D&O
DIARY
(Sept.
26,
2013),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/09/articles/executive-compensation/enoughsaid-yet-say-on-pay-litigation-may-have-had-its-day/ (last visited May 1, 2017)
(providing background on say on pay litigation) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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have a “good faith” defense against private suits, such that if they
could show that their disclosure was made in good faith after due
inquiry, a suit would be dismissed, or, there would be no private
cause of action.
My main response, though, to the broader objection that my
solution has no teeth is the following. Outrage-inducing scandals
occur with some regularity. This by itself is leading to more calls
for action. At the same time, companies’ concerns for their
reputations are leading them to compete in the spheres of
sustainability and corporate social responsibility.65 Compliance
initiatives are increasingly focused not just on compliance with
law but also with firms’ codes of ethics and conduct (which of
course also reflect the firms’ reputational concerns). Moreover,
regulators who have supervisory and monitoring responsibilities
are well-positioned to make inquiries as to what steps are being
taken to avoid and uncover Repugnant Business Models.
In sum, given the outrage certain business models elicit, and
the extent to which an appreciable amount of the outrage mirrors
general concerns of law, the concept of Repugnant Business
Models would seem well-situated to command attention in this
general sphere. And not just perfunctory check-the-box attention.
The inquiry will by its nature be nuanced, given that the category
does not have necessary and sufficient conditions.
V. Conclusion
In their pursuit of profit, what should corporations refrain
from doing? There are legal prohibitions, of course, but there are
other pressures as well, including in the form of outrage. Some
such pressures lead to the desired changes, and some do not, but
even when they do not, they may very well influence what
65. See, e.g., DELOITTE, 2014 GLOBAL SURVEY ON REPUTATIONAL RISK:
REPUTATION@RISK 17 (2014), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/
global/Documents/Governance-Risk-Compliance/gx_grc_Reputation@Risk%20
survey%20report_FINAL.pdf (discussing steps to be taken by companies to
protect their reputations); Sustainability Reporting, AT&T, http://about.
att.com/content/csr/home/sustainability-reporting.html (last visited May 1,
2017) (outlining sustainability goals taken by AT&T) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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corporations do and do not do, and how they present themselves.
Indeed, survey evidence suggests that corporations view
reputational risk as one of the most significant risks they face.66
While reputational risk may arise from bad outcomes of business
models and conduct that would generally be considered
non-objectionable, it can also arise from reactions to business
models themselves. The use of child labor provides a ready
example.
To make my argument, I distinguish between three
categories of business models: a) those that are repugnant and
warrant pure outrage; b) those that cause complex, somewhat
negative, reactions—conflicted outrage—for reasons relating to
societal value conflicts on various subjects, including paternalism
versus autonomy or the respective rights and obligations of
people with greater, and fewer, resources; and c) finally, those
that in my view elicit unwarranted outrage, where the outrage is
often a case of “shooting the messenger,” trying to will away an
inconvenient fact about the world.
These three categories do not, of course, capture the universe
of business models. Initially, I started by trying to define and
make salient the concept of repugnant business models, and flesh
out a definition that could be a basis for action, perhaps in the
form of shareholder proposals requesting corporate boards to take
steps to discourage such models, or disclosure requirements
under which companies would describe the steps they are taking
to avoid using such models. So far, so ambitious, but perhaps
tractable, at least as a starting point. Consider in this regard the
enormous negative reaction to the dramatic price rises in
Daraprim and EpiPen, both of which are life-saving. The price
rises were legal under present law, but were so unpopular that
the companies to some extent retrenched, or competitors
emerged. But the fix was not immediate: some damage was done.
And what of behavior that is less extreme and hence less well
publicized?
Having considered “pure” outrage, I began thinking about
outrage that seemed to me less pure—where what was at issue
was controversial, and sometimes defended, even vigorously so.
66. See id. at 4 (presenting survey evidence of corporations’ concern for
reputational risk).
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Without, again, attempting to capture the universe of business
models, I delineated two other categories, one of which involved
activities and values about which people have principled but
differing views, and the other of which involved clashes, but, dare
I say it, less principled ones. Clearly, this judgment is extremely
contestable, as are, more broadly, my three categories, and the
criteria for inclusion therein. Indeed, some of what I am arguing
for rests first on principles people have that they will not readily
abandon (and this is not to say that they should.).
This project seeks to persuade readers of three things. First,
that developing a principled basis for characterizing what
constitutes bad corporate behavior is a good idea. Second, that
considering and debating the assumptions that would support or
argue against my categories or criteria, or both, is also a good
idea. Most importantly, I hope that this approach, and these
categories, can be used to influence corporate behavior. If I
succeed in making Repugnant Business Models salient, I can
envision, among other sources of pressure and influence,
shareholder proposals that ask companies to consider what they
are doing to ensure that they do not have such models, or judges
or regulators taking the characterization and the laxity of a
company’s efforts in preventing such models into account in
determining how they treat the company. Lawmakers, too, might
be prodded to act. On the flip side, perhaps companies with
business models that do not warrant outrage can put up a better
defense when the models are attacked. I think a much better job
can be done articulating a principled rationale for when outrage
at corporate behavior is, and is not, warranted, saving outrage’s
force for when it is most appropriate. I hope that I have made
some contribution to the effort.

